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Crisis at Little Rock
Eisenhower, History, and
Mediated Political Realities
Presidential rhetoric attending U.S. foreign policy crises

bas received a good deal of scholarly attention. Fewer studies have focused on
domestic policy crisis.! There is little doubt that domestic division over civil
rights has given the contemporary presidency one of its most thorny, if not
recalcitrant domestic concerns. Presidential discourse intended to resolve crisis
in the civil rights arena is never without rhetorical constraints; these limitations remind us of the tendency of public presidential address to reverberate in
various sectors of the nation with differing consequences for each.
In the age of televised and print-mediated reality, the echoes of presidential
discourse resound in sometimes unexpected and usually wholly fragmented
tidbits, creating afterimages and impressions capable of overpowering any clear
clescription of original intent. A study of domestic presidential crisis rhetoric
in the age of mass-mediated reality invites a focus on the responses of mass
opinion leaders that create the "crisis" label and establish its "resolution ." The
fundamental negotiation of a civil rights "crisis," then, also invites an investigation into mediated responses.
A recent critique argues, however, that merely examining the interpretive
processes of audience members in the act of decoding mediated texts is not
enough. As Kevin Carragee observes, "Iilnterpretive mass communication
research has failed to place media texts and media audiences within meaningful historical, social, and cultural contexts.'" This essay adopts a strategy to
correct this oversight. We believe a focus on media coverage alone will yield a
truncated view of history and, simultaneously, that a pure focus on the historical "record" cannot fully reflect history as experienced through the mediated
coverage that is also part of the ongoing cultural milieu.
Kathleen J. Turner argues that the study and the processes of history are
essentially rhetorical in nature and function. Accordingly, Turner believes "we
need both rhetorical criticism's message-centered focus and rhetorical history's
contextual construction." Moreover, "the melding of historical and rhetorical
methodologies can contribute to an understanding of the complex latitudinal
and longitudinal processes of symbolic influence.'" In this essay, we adopt both
189
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historical and critical methods in an effort to demonstrate how the history and
mediated coverage of a contemporary domestic crisis can be mutually informative. By outlining the rhetorical norms, strategies, and constraints involved
in a print-mediated crisis and by supplementing it with historical investigation, we hope to create a richer understanding of the rhetorical dimensions of
the mass media, as well as highlight the historical and cultural legacy of that
experience. In Turner's phraseology, both the latitudinal and longitud in al
aspects of rhetorical history will constitute our primary subject matter. In particular we focus on mediated coverage of President Eisenhower's handli ng of
the Little Ro<k, Arkansas, school desegregation crisis of 1957.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The desegregation crisis at Little Rock's Central High School, precipitated
by the 1954 Brown v. Topeka Board of Education decision, provided Preside nt
Eisenhower "with the most persistent and critical domestic challenge of his
eight-year presidency... • The civil rights issue was particularly vexin g to
Eisenhower because of a number of factors including the president's: (1 ) personal philosophy and temperament; (2) view of the role, powers, and fun ction
of the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government; (3) fea r that
the implementation of the Brown decision would precipitate federal-state ra ncor and division, creating a constitutional crisis; (4) own regard for and pol itical relationship with the South.

Personal Philosophy and Temperament
According to Robert Fredrick Burk, Eisenhower was ill at ease about racial
matters. He preferred a moderate approach rather than the "bully pulpit." His
belief in "free enterprise" caused "revulsion at any form of 'coercive' fede ral
regulation.'" By temperament, Eisenhower's philosophy of government was to
find a "middle way"; he made an effort to avoid and discount extremes "on
both sides." Moreover, "Eisenhower was utterly convinced of the superiori ty of
this approach.'" In a cabinet meeting of March 1956, in response to a cabinet
paper circulated by Attorney General Herbert Brownell that outlined suggestions on civil rights legislation, the president observed:
I believe that Herb Brownell should put forward what he has got here, but
3 statement that man y Americans understandably are separated by deep
emo tions on this subject . One o f the prime reasons for this is that, after all .
another system was upheld by the Supreme Court for 60 years. These people
in the South were not breaking the law for the pa st 60 years. but , ever since

with
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the "separate but equal" decision , they have been obeying the Constitution of
the United States. Now we cannot erase the emotions of three generations
just overnight. . .. People have a right to disagree with the Supreme Court
decision-since the Supreme Court has disagreed with its own decis ion of 60
years standing-but , of course, the new decision should now be ca rried out.7

Eisenhower adopted a narrow definition of how constitutional law should be
enforced and, as a result, critics felt that he was somewhat ambivalent, if not
opposed, to a vigorous fight for black civil rights.'

Attitudes Toward the Coordinate Branches
Eisenhower believed in limited government. He felt that law was not the
ultimate solution to moral turpitude. When faced with any crisis, he had developed a "personal habit of caution" and, not surprisingly, this led him to "moderation in the exercise of presidential powers."' He preferred to address racial
issues at a cabinet or subcabinet level. When he talked of racial equality it was
through the "occasional assertion of democratic principles. At the same time
the [pJresident carefully circumscribed his subordinates' activities to areas of
clear federal jurisdiction, greatest international propaganda value, and minimum risk of political fallout or domestic unrest."10 His ideology actually was
translated into careful, jurisdictionally controlled federal efforts such as desegregating the military and schools on army posts.
Eisenhower opposed an active judiciary in areas such as public school
desegregation because he believed that in the South, in particular, such
activism threatened state support for public schools." He felt that the Brown
decisions of 1954 and 1955 had made the executive's job more burdensome. In
a private letter to his friend "Swede" Hazlett, Eisenhower lamented: "I think
that no single event has so disturbed the domestic scene in many years as did
the Supreme Court's decision in 1954 in the school desegregation case. That
decision and similar ones earlier and later in point of time have interpreted the
Constitution in such a fashion as to put heavier responsibilities than before on
the Federal government in the matter of assuring each citizen his guaranteed
constitutional rights." Yet Eisenhower would also adamantly maintain: "There
must be respect for the Constitution-which means the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Constitution-or we shall have,chaos.... This I believe
with all my heart-and shall always act accordingly.""
Eisenhower was especially uneasy with post-Brown implementation deci'ons on behalf of desegregation, fearing that forced efforts would result in the
mplete federal assumption of public education, a prospect the president
portedly abhorred." In a letter to Governor James F. Byrnes of South
Carolina, Eisenhower described his concerns regarding executive action pertaining to Brown: "It was my purpose .. . to provide a moderate approach to a

t
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difficult problem and to make haste slowly in seeking to meet it. I believe that
in the question under discussion there are moral values as well as legal requi rements to be considered; moreover, I am aware that emotions are deeply stirred
on both sides."" In a personal letter to George Landes dated 12 September
1957, Eisenhower also wrote: "The fact is that many states are stoutly opposed
to any entry of the Federal Government into school affairs, maintaining that
the final result would be Federal control of education. This, of course, would
be a calamity.. . . [I) t is clear that primary responsibility for the schools in our
country properly devolves upon local and state authorities."1S Thus Eisenhower
championed local, gradual efforts at desegregating the schools and this gradualism was of some comfort to Southern segregationists. It also caused much
discomfiture for civil rights advocates.

Federal-State Relations and Constitutional Crisis
Eisenhower once privately told Governor Byrnes of South Carolina that
improvement in race relations . . . will he healthy and sound only if it starts
locally. I do not believe prejudice . . . will succumb to compulsi on.
Consequently, I believe that federal law imposed upon OUf states in such a way
as to bring abo ut a conflict of the police power of the states and the natio n,
wo uld set back the cause of progress in race relations for a long, long timc,, 6

This fear was in part responsible for increasing tension between the executive
and judicial branches regarding "appropriate" action in response to Brown and
subsequent implementation of desegregation plans for public schools. When
Attorney General Herbert Brownell was asked by the Supreme Court to file an
amicus curiae brief regarding the Brown case, Eisenhower questioned the Justice
Department's authority to "speak out on state-enforced segregation." Moreover,
Eisenhower's belief in the separation of powers among the three branches of
government continuously led him to refuse comment on any Supreme Court
ruling. The president believed that commentary on any case would be an open
invitation to comment on each one-something he wanted to avoid. His consistent position in this regard was that of "executive neutrality.""
Eisenhower was equally cautious regarding implementation of the Brown
decision." In a brief filed 11 April 1955, the Eisenhower administration advocated a "middle-of-the-road concept of moderation with a degree of fairness"
that left implementation of desegregation plans to the federal district co urts
who were to be given power to approve or deny local desegregation plans. I'
The Supreme Court followed this approach in its implementation decision of
24 May 1955. Such plans were to be accomplished with "all deliberate speed."
But it was questionable as to how federal district judges in the South would
interpret that particular directive.
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In addition, the president was quite concerned that local police powers be
ven every opportunity to restore law and order in the event that violence
tended attempted enforcement. The idea of federal troops occupying
uthern states evoked grim images of Reconstruction, the negative history
d outcome of which Eisenhower adamantly preferred to avoid during his
dministration. It remained unclear, however, as to how the administration
would respond to violent segregationist obstruction. Mob violence in
Texarkana and Mansfield, Texas, as well as in Clinton, Tennessee in 1956 did
little to reassure civil rights advocates that both their rights and their safety
would be protected by federal intervention. In response to such incidents, the
president would take the position that "Under the law the federal government
cannot . . . move into a state until the state is not able to handle the matter."'·
Exactly when and under what circumstances federal intervention would occur
mnained decidedly vague. At the 1956 Republican National Convention in San
Francisco, Eisenhower personally squelched efforts to strengthen the party's
desegregation plan and complained privately that the Supreme Court was
moving too fast and excoriated it for its "stupidity."" The furor refused to
abate. Circumstances were afoot that would throw the president headlong into
a cauldron of constitutional crisis at Little Rock.
For a time, Eisenhower also seemed reticent to introduce legislation in the
civil rights arena, preferring voluntary to compulsory efforts. Because of his
moderate stance, legislative proposals were left to "languish in the Congress.""
An "emasculated version" of a civil rights bill actually was passed by Congress
in 1957; less than one month later, the Little Rock crisis began."

Political Relations with the South
It was of no little consequence that many of the positions outlined above
were also based on Eisenhower's belief that a strong anti-segregationist stance
would ultimately "defeat forever the possibility of developing a viable
Republican Party in the South."" This belief no doubt provided a rather striking rationale for Eisenhower's cautious approach to the question of school
desegregation. Moreover, Eisenhower had spent a good deal of time in the
South and was sensitive to southern history and sensibilities. The moderate
position seemed principled and reasonable to Eisenqower, but it also, at times,
played into the hands of segregationists who were intent upon obstructing any
form of integration. Eisenhower continued to view "extremists" with suspicion, whether they were from the White Citizen's Councils or the NAACP. J.
Edgar Hoover's ongoing updates on both groups increasingly gave the president little comfort. Events in Little Rock, Arkansas, during September 1957,
could not help but add to the president's discomfiture. A true political media
extravaganza was in the offing.
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MEDIATED POLITICAL REALITIES

According to Murray Edelman, "Political leaders become signs of competence, evil, nationalism, future promise, and other virtues and vices and so help
introduce meaning to a confusing political world."" 1t was just such a world that
the average American encountered in the morning newspaper on 25 September
1957. The day before, Dwight David Eisenhower federalized the Arkansas
National Guard and brought in paratroopers from the 10 I st Airborne Division
to enforce the court-ordered desegregation of Little Rock's Central High School.
President Eisenhower and Governor Orval Eugene Faubus became key political
antagonists in a dramatic exchange. Tension was symbolically created not only
in the authorization of federal troops to quell unrest in the state of Arkansas,
evoking negative images of Reconstruction with its attendant federal -state
dashes, but also in the mediated clash of wills between the president and the
chief executive of the state. That mediated reality, in turn, presents a unique
opportunity to examine a modern political spectade.
"Mediated, secondhand reality is our politics," according to Dan Nimmo and
James Combs, "and there is little we can do about it:"· Edelman maintains that
News .. . is not so much a desc ription of events as a catalyst of political su pport and oppos iti o n in the light of the spectator's sensitivities, areas of ign o rance, and ideo logical stance. The acceptance of a story plot that defines th e
background of a reported develo pment and its future consequences is crucial.
Th e scenarios fo r the future that news accounts evoke are rarely acted out
according to th eir sc ripts. They are aborted or repla ced by alternative sce narios implicit in lat er news accounts, but before that happens they in fluence
political suppo rt and action . In thi s light , po litics consists of a panoply of
ove rlapping and conflicting spectacles that fade from the scene 3 S they give
birth to thd r succcsso rsP

Moreover, "News of controversial issues keeps tensions between groups ali ve
or intensifies or broadens them."" Exposure to the ambiguities and controversies of the news not o nly defines our images of the political world but also our
self-images. Audiences interpret news interpretations against their own background, experience, and ideology and what plays itself out in newspaper or
magazine accounts is a dramaturgical dance of both self and political society.
We will maintain that print-mediated accounts of the crisis at Little Rock
unfolded in three acts. The changing scenarios within each act were crucial to
audience interpretation and provide a centerpiece for our analysis of mediated
responses. In particular, we will argue that these mediated responses helped
shape the short-term political, historical, and cultural consciousness. As the
characteristic themes of each scene burned brightly and then, in turn, faded
out, we find an interesting, if not provocative, political spectacle. For Edelma n,
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then, "[tlhe political spectacle... evokes a drama that objectifies hopes and
fears" but probably resolves very few of them."
Nimmo and Combs also note that mediated political realities have a "melodramatic imperative." The key to melodrama is to mount a series of scenic
environments wherein moral justice is on trial. More than merely identifying
heroes and villains, melodramatic imperatives require suspense to maintain
audience interest and, as such, evoke both quiescence and arousal in audiences.
Danger, threat, narrow escapes, heroic and vil1ainous action, and reward and

punishment for good and evil are staples of the genre; news narratives are
often constrained to both create and follow these imperatives. While happy
endings may be useful, they are not essential; sometimes full resolution is simply not a realistic option. The content and structure of mediated political reality is a joint product of audience expectations and media attempts to fulfill
them. lO We believe tha t the news sources' and audiences' sense of melodrama is
particularly heightened when events, personages, and mediated behaviors are
also saddled with the label, "crisis."
CRISIS AT LITTLE ROCK

Following the Supreme Court's integration rulings of 1954 and 1955, the
Little Rock School Board, at the direction of Superintendent Virgil T. Blossom,
drew up plans for the gradual integration of the public school system in Little
Rock. This was a three-phase plan in which the high schools would be integrated by 3 September 1957, at the start of the school year. According to Daisy
Bates, a member of the NAACP in Little Rock, the city " had apparently
accepted the board's plans; and there seemed little reason to expect serious
opposition, much less what followed."" What followed was perceived by some
as the most serious challenge to federal authority since the Civil War. Enacted
on a daily basis in a mediated environment, the rhetorical characteristics of
this particular drama unfolded in three acts.

Act One
Act One of the mediated narrative began on 2 September when the engaged
public was informed that tensions of high national interest were percolating
precariously in Arkansas. The audience was given a brief precis of the plot, the
location, and the cast of characters crucial to unfolding events.
The Plot Unfolds
The "action line" of the plot was presented in a direct, straightforward manner. Under the Little Rock School Board desegregation plan, the first school to
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be integrated was Central High School. A series of legal challenges by various
groups such as the segregationist Capital Citizens Council resulted in a ruling
by a Federal District Court that the integration of Little Rock's public educa·
tion facilities had to begin with the start of the 1957 school year.
On 2 September 1957, Arkansas Governor Orval E. Faubus activated the
state's National Guard and placed it at Little Rock's Central High School. The
"270 armed Arkansas militia and fifty members of the state police patrolled the
school grounds and stood guard at all the entrances," charged by the governor
to prevent any outbreak of violence that might accompany the integration of
Little Rock's public schools."
That night, at 10:05 p.m., Faubus addressed the people of Arkansas from the
studios of station KTHV. According to the governor, since "a federal court has
ruled that no further litigation is possible before the forcible integratio n of
Negroes and whites in Central High School tomorrow, the evidence of discord,
anger and resentment has come to me from so many sources as to become a
deluge." As the governor descr ibed it, Little Rock was a city "on the brink of a
riot [while) outraged white mothers ... prepared to march on the school at 6
a.m.; caravans of indignant white citizens .. . converg[ ed) on Little Rock fro m
all over Arkansas. And Little Rock stores ... were selling out of knives.""
Given these circumstances, the governor argued, "it [was) necessary to sum·
mon the Guard in advance of the school's opening to forestall violence.""
Faubus explained that the mobilized National Guard at Central High School
would serve neither as "segregationists nor integrationists, but as soldiers . . .
carry[ing) out their assigned tasks:"lS to "maintain or restore the peace and
good order of th is commun ity."" Faubus refused to say "whether the troops
were called out to prevent Negroes from entering the school," but he warned
that "if any Negro tried to enter [Central High) violence would break out . ..
and he was against violence."l7
On 3 September, the opening day of school, "peace" was maintained when
the Little Rock Board of Education urged the nine black students selected to
integrate Central High School to stay home, and nineteen hundred white stu·
dents entered the school "through a cordon of several hundred Guardsmen
armed with carbines and billy clubs."" The Board of Education went to the
U.S. District Court to ask Judge Ronald Davies to clarify the issue. After a four·
minute hearing, Judge Davies ruled that integration at Central High School
must "begin forthwith."'" Worried about the safety of the nine black students,
members of the Little Rock NAACP arranged a police escort 'for the next
morning. But Daisy Bates was told by a police officer that city police could not
escort the students up to Central High because the "school is off limits to the
city police while it's 'occupied' by the Arkansas National Guardsmen "40
Eight of the nine black students were told to meet the escort of police and
ministers from the Interracial Ministerial Alliance at 8:30 on the morning of 4
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September. The ninth student, fifteen -year-old Elizabeth Eckford, was not contacted and the next morning she attempted to enter Cen tral High School
alone. When she approached the entrance "she found a youth, barely older
than she, in the uniform of the National Guard, barring her way,"" and the
drama was underway.
Thus, during act one the basic facts of the plot line were presented in a
fairly concise, straightforward manner. The sitting governor of a state had
issued an order to the National Guard to "keep the peace" in Little Rock. The
order prevented the court-ordered integration of Central High School. As the
Arkansas Gazette observed, when the Arkansas National Guard carried out the
orders of Governor Faubus and blocked the entrance of Elizabeth Eckford to
Central High School, the issue was "no longer segregation vs. integration. The
question has now become the supremacy of the United States Government in
all matters of law."" As Attorney General Herbert Brownell put the matter in a
summary statement to the president, "no effort whatever had been made by
the Governor of Arkansas to use his powers to uphold the jurisdiction of the
federal court and to aid, rather than subvert, the execution of its orders. On
the contrary, his purpose seemed clearly directed toward a nullification of the
court's mandate."41
Momentous, Historic Conflict, or Potential Crisis
The opening act of the mediated drama of Little Rock suggested that the
events being played out in Arkansas were part of a much larger issue, an issue
of possible historic significance. As Time observed, "Through the U.S. South
ran the sight and sound, the pain and glory of historic sociological change ... .
As is often the case in such moments of history, the worst and the best in
man-hate and human charity, stupidity and wisdom-<:ame out before the
world."" Events in Little Rock, reportedly "the first time that the issue of
Federal versus state authority has been reached on the integration problem,"
now "set the stage for the first major test of the United State Supreme Court's
decision of May 1954, that racial segregation in schools is unconstitutional.""
Early on then, the news media pegged the issue in Arkansas as an important
·constitutional question"" that had "agitated constitutional lawyers since the
earliest days of the Republic .. . . Where does the Federal authority end, and
where do states' rights begin?"" The Arkansas Gazette observed:
Until last Thursday the matter of gradual limited integration in the Little
Rock schools was a loca l problem which had been well and wisely handled by
responsible local officials who have had-and we bdieve still have-the support of a majority of the people of this city. On that day Mr. Faubus appeared
in Chancery Court on beha lf of 3 small but militant minority and chose to
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make it a state problem. On Monday night he called out the National Guard
and made it a natio nal problem. 41l

News coverage seemed to underscore a feeling of unexpectedness-tha t
somehow this historic drama should not have taken place at this location involving these characters_ The stage for mediated melodrama was set Arkansas was
not really a part of the Deep South but was, instead, "on the periphery of the
die-hard states" with their strategy of "all-out resistance to school desegregation."" The Arkansas State Board of Education had already integrated the seven
state colleges and the University of Arkansas had admitted blacks into the graduate school as early as 1948_ 50 The state did "not have a record of racial violence;" in fact, during the "very week that Little Rock was supposed to explode,
three other Arkansas communities-Ozark, Fort Smith and Van Buren-integrated without a murmur... _ [B]us integration [wa]s a statewide fact, and Little
Rock's white and Negro citizens ha[d] become accustomed to their Negro
policemen."Sl In Little Rock itself the "consensus among responsible citizens was
that while integration of public schools was not popular, it was nonetheless
inevitable." Most "civic, religious, educational and business leaders supported
the Little Rock Board of Education's decision to carry out the integration
order."" Yet, the Supreme Court's decision mandating school integration was
"unexpectedly getting its first major test" in Little Rock, Arkansas.53
Vivid Characterization and Lengthy Rationales for Mysterious Action
That same element of surprise also seemed to permeate the mediated development of the most interesting character in this phase of the drama-Arkansas
Governor Orval Eugene Faubus. As constructed in the media, his contradictory persona mysteriously lacked a history of deep ideological conviction to
motivate his action in Little Rock.
Both Time and Newsweek ran profiles of the governor. While each differed
regarding Faubus's exact place of birth, they did agree on his bucolic origi ns.
Under the title "Hillbilly, Slightly Sophisticated," Time noted that in his fi rst
term Faubus had been an "Arkansas-style progressive." He was a "product of
the hill country;" born "so far back in the Ozarks of Northwest Arkansas th at
the first paved road to the outside world was not completed until 1949." This
article highlighted the fact that there were few blacks in this area of Arkansas
and Faubus had "no background of race prejudice."" Newsweek crafted
Faubus's characterization by noting that "Of all the South's governors, Orval
Eugene Faubus of Arkansas might seem the least likely to set himself against
the power of President Eisenhower and the Federal government over the issue
of school integration ." He was born "so deep in the Ozark hills that a man
might pass a lifetime there without ever seeing a Negro_"55 Similarly, the New
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York Times said that Faubus appea red "from his record to be the least likely of
all the Southern Governors to volunteer for a leading role in the school integration showdown."56 In background stories about the crisis. the Times
referred to the Governor as "a Democrat with a liberal background."" The
Faubus "turnabout" was described as being "so abrupt that no one had anticipated it. For weeks. Gov. Orval Faubus .. . had been silent on the integration
attempts that would be made this fall in the schools of several cities in his state.
His public stand had always been that integration was strictly a problem for
local school boards to decide."" Thus. although in the past Faubus had exhibited wa moderate stand in favor of segregation."" there was no indication of a
professed ideological basis for his opposition to the federal government. Such
inscrutability made him all the more mysterious. Crackpot. opportunist. or
southern savior were different labels audiences could apply to fill in the mediated mosaic of ideological ambiguity.
However. as the opening day of school drew closer. " Faubus began to sound
very much like an entirely different man." He "issued a statement bitterly
accusing the Federal government of trying to cram integration down Arkansas'
throat;"'" appeared in a state court hearing where he won an injunction against
the integration order by arguing that "a great majority of the people of Little
Rock are opposed to integration;" and publicly warned that "bloodshed and
mob violence would result."61 When u.S. federal district Judge Ronald Davies
threw out the injunction. Faubus "went on television and radio to drop a
bombshell: He was calling out the Arkansas National Guard to preserve the
peace at Little Rock's Central High Schoo I."" Along with the contradictions in
Governor Faubus's persona. the media also designated him as the responsible
character in the unfolding Little Rock melodrama. He was labeled as the specific agent who had set the drama in motion by ordering the National Guard
into action. The "troops acted under direct orders of Gov. Orval E. Faubus ... • 3
who had "createldl the crisis.""
Portrayed as a fanatic who had lost touch with the reality of the very situation
for which he was responsible. the Faubus character took on almost comic proportions. All during the Little Rock drama. Faubus maintained that he had done
nothing to frustrate the order to integrate. He maintained. instead. that he had
acted within his rights as governor to "preserve peace and to prevent bloodshed."·' Faubus insisted that he was "not violating the order issued by a Federal
District Court," but rather. was "using the Guardsmen to prevent violence .....
The Governor's persistence in this position was contrasted with print-mediated reports suggesting that regardless of Faubus's stated reasons. he was
indeed frustrating the order to integrate and defying the authority of the
United States federal government. For example. a headline in the New York
Times announced. "Faubus Bids U.S. Recede on Order For Integration." The
article quoted the governor as saying that the only way to prevent bloodshed
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was "that the United States would have to recede from its demand for immediate school integration" in Little Rock-Faubus saw "no alternative.""
Thus, as mediated, Faubus was portrayed as a man "face to face with the
power of the U.S. Government, and that Government could not possibly ignore
or withdraw in the face of Faubus's challenge to its courts, to law and sim ple
decency."" While this image might engender support among some of the more
fanatic states' rights advocates, for most it probably conveyed the image of an
unrealistic obstructionist. This perception was heightened by mediated reports
that Faubus had retreated " behind the guarded gates of his execut ive
mansion.""9 As Time noted, "To ward off all invaders, Orval Faubus deployed
his militia around his pillared executive mansion, disappeared from public view
like a feudal baron under siege."'· By implication, mysterious machinations
inside the mansion were purposefully denied public scrutiny.
From the Governor's mansion-"still guarded by the state police" 'IFaubus had "fired off a wild-eyed message to the President of the U.S."n The
telegram was widely reported as asking for Eisenhower's help in stopping the
"unwarranted interference of Federal agents in this area," declaring that Faubus
would "not cooperate with the Federal agents now investigating his use of
troops to block integration,"" complaining that "his telephone lines were
being tapped," and saying he feared that "Federal authorities [were) ... plotting to arrest him."74
Faubus's persona was developed further as the media tried to capture his
motivation. Described as an "opportunist" who did not represent the people in
whose name he had undertaken this action, the Governor provided "no reasonable explanation for [his) highhanded action, except that he hoped to make
political capital for himself."" Moreover, engaged audiences learned that
Faubus recently had begun "talking about running for a third term in a state
that traditionally frowns on three terms for a governor. He needed a dramatic
issue, and he needed the red-neck votes of segregationist eastern Arkansas."'"
Thus, he may have decided "that a strong stand for segregation now would be
politically popular in 1958, when he [could) bid for a third term."n
The media found "indications that Faubus was being used by segregationist
politicians in the South,"" who planned to issue the first challenge to federally
ordered integration outside of their own region. As noted in the New York
Tim es, "What has taken shape [since the Supreme Court's 1954 decision) is an
unremitting war for the border states which are divided on racial policies
because of their mixed population ratios. Deep South political leaders, seeing
the encirclement threat, have regularly sent emissaries to the border states to
bolster their position."'9
The media coverage did portray some support for the governor's action;
however, most of it was localized in the South . For example, the Memph is
Commercial Appeal maintained that although the "successful refusal by anyone
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to ohey the orders of the court would lead to confusion that would eventually
amount to chaos." the issue in Arkansas was a "clash between unrealistic laws
and rulings ... and the responsibility of a state's chief executive to preserve
order. Governor Faubus has raised a national issue intimately concerned with
how a theory not accepted by a people can be hastily translated into action."so
However. the media also indicated that Faubus was not speaking for the
community of Little Rock. Indeed. it maintained Little Rock did not ask for
help. and high-profile citizens were quoted as saying that the governor's aid
was unnecessary. Thus. while the majority of citizens in Little Rock may not
have welcomed the order to desegregate. there was also a "growing body of
Southern white opinion that segregation must yield to the times."" The
Arkansas Cazene-"the state's leading newspaper"-maintained that the "matter of gradual limited integration in Little Rock schools was a local problem
which had been well and wisely handled by responsible local officials who
had-and we believe still have-the support of a majority of the people of this

aty."·'
Probably the most vocal and widely covered critic of Governor Faubus's
action was the Mayor of Little Rock. Woodrow Wilson Mann. Mann was
adamant that no one in Little Rock had asked Faubus to send troops to the
city. and the mayor and the Board of Education had insisted that the local
police force could handle any potential mayhem.·' Mann "vehemently
attacked Faubus's intervention as a 'political hoax ...••• and demanded that the
Governor "give the people of this state evidence of possible racial violence
instead of running off and hiding" behind the guarded walls of the mansion.· s
According to Mann. the Governor made a "wholly unwarranted interference
with the internal affairs of this city." He acted "without request from those of
us who are directly responsible for the preservation of peace and order. The
only effect of his action is to create tensions where none existed. If any racial
trouble does develop the blame rests squarely on the doorstep of the
Governor's mansion."86
Mann's criticism of Faubus was not limited to the governor's thwarting of
the agreed-upon integration plan. The mayor also expressed the concern of
many: The governor had placed himself and the state on a collision course with
the United States government. Mann. quoted on the front page of the New York
Timts, charged that Faubus's "words spell sedition. his defiance rebellion ....
His word and action echo another period of our history when irresponsible
men plunged this nation into a tragic civil war."" The mayor also made public
appeals to the other main character of this drama-President Eisenhower.
Maintaining that Faubus's calling out the National Guard to prevent integration had created a "state of anarchy,"·· Mann called upon Eisenhower for
action: "The President of the United States can no longer ignore the gravity of
the situation. Time for realistic action is long-since delayed. The issue of inte-
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gration has become secondary-the security and prestige of the United States
of America is paramount."89
Eisenhower's character in this mediated narrative is intriguing. His role is
analogous to Beckett's Godar. While he is an integral part of the plot narrative,
he always seems to be just offstage during act one. One explanation for this is
that Eisenhower had physically removed himself from the nation's capital. On
4 September, the president and Mamie went to Newport, Rhode Island, for a
vacation that Eisenhower predicted would be "the time of our lives."90 At a
press conference before leaving Washington, Eisenhower was asked about the
developing situation in Little Rock. He observed that there "seems to have been
a road block thrown in the way [of integration ] and the next step will have to
be by the lawyers and the jurists."·' This remark signaled what was to be the
underlying tone of Eisenhower's "go slow" approach for most of act one.
The media assured Americans the administration was "keeping on top of the
situation." Almost as soon as the events in Arkansas became national news,
Eisenhower ordered the Justice Department to keep in "close touch" with "the
school integration dispute in Little Rock." However, spokespersons for the
administration were always careful to add that there were "no plans for Federal
intervention. Officials took the position that it was neither legally possible nor
politically desirable for the Executive branch of the Government to step in at
this stage. They said the next move was up to the Federal district judge sitti ng
in the case."92
Part of the reason for the perceived dearth in presidential leadership during
what we are calling act one no doubt also stems from Eisenhower's own beliefs,
especially those regarding the Supreme Court's rulings on desegregation . As
Eisenhower biographer Stephen E. Ambrose notes: " Eisenhower had great
sympathy for the white South ... and Faubus counted on it to keep the
President inactive while he battled the federal court."·'
Eisenhower was described as taking "a moderate stand on the integration
question. While recommending a go-slow policy, he has often spoken of its
inevitability."·' At a press conference on the morning the news of Little Rock
broke, Eisenhower responded to a question about the events in Arkansas wi th a
"call for restraint on the racial issue." He added "You cannot change people's
hearts merely by laws. Laws ... presumably express the conscience of a nation
and its determination or will to do something. But the laws here are to be executed gradually." The president said that while he remained cognizant of the
"emotional difficulties" encountered by blacks who attend separate schools, he
also recognized that "there [we] re very strong emotions on the other side, people that see a picture of the mongrelization of the race, they call it."·5
The president felt that Americans would "whip this thing in the long run"
by "being true to themselves and not merely by law."" Eisenhower had earlier
stated he could "conceive of no situation in which he would use Federal

CRISIS AT LITTLE ROCK

203

troops to enforce school integration or other civil rights matters in the
South,"" The positions advocated publicly by the president were not incompatible with Faubus's. At times, Faubus even cited President Eisenhower to
support a traditional states' rights philosop hy. Faubus maintained
Eisenhower had described the federal government as "a creature of the states,"
warning that it should not become "a Frankenstein that would engulf and
destroy the separate state governments.""
Although the president made it clear that he had "no desire to get the
Administration involved in the controversy," he did telegram Governor Faubus
saying, "The only assurance I can give you is that the Federal Constitution will
be upheld by me by every legal means at my command."" This message was
described in the New York Times as "the strongest stand the President has yet
taken in support of the United States Supreme Court decision declaring unconstitutional segregation of Negro and white students in the public schools," IOO
As the curtain drew down on act one, the media directed attention to the
impasse in Arkansas, President Eisenhower's desire not to involve the federal
government, his professed hope that good sense would prevail, and the complex and dangerous legal options that loomed if the situation did not resolve
itself. In closing our description of act one, we conclude that emergent rhetorical characteristics associated with this print-mediated narrative included dramatic staging with potential for historic or widespread connict, vivid
characterization , and lengthy, sometimes tortuous, mediated rationales to
impute motives for inexplicable or mysterious actions. Moreover, disputants
and disputes were located in several areas simultaneously; in this instance,
local, regional, and national arenas.
Act Two
Act one ended with a fully developed problem and no real sense of future
direction. Act two was to provide a hope for resolution, but as with most
three-act dramas, that hope would prove to be false. A peaks and valleys scenic
environment of raised hopes and dashed expectations would dominate act two
as an increasingly complex dramatic narrative continued to unfold.
Protagonist and Antagonist Meet
Heroes and villains eventually face each other. The White House strategy
was to let Faubus play out his hand with the hope that he would eventually
~alize how untenable his situation was. Faubus, in turn, seemed to be looking
for a quick exit from his present dilemma. As Newsweek noted: " It was at the
height of the pressures against him, when seemingly he couldn't escape from
his own trap, that the way was opened to him,"lol That "way out" was to have a
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meeting with the president. Attorney General Herbert Brownell was strongly
against the meeting because Faubus had "soiled" himself. Brownell also
pointed out that Arkansas Congressman Brooks Hays, "two senators, a Little
Rock newspaper publisher, and Winthrop Rockefeller had all tried, and 'all
came to the conclusion it was hopeless.' 'Well: Eisenhower replied, 'Perhaps
the time is now ripe:" And he told the attorney general to get together with
Sherman Adams to compose a telegram "for Faubus to send to Newport,
requesting a meeting."I02
The media held that the meeting was at Faubus's request. The New York
Times reported that Governor Faubus "asked President Eisenhower today to
confer with him on racial integration of Central High School in Little Rock. The
President promptly suggested a meeting lat Newport) Friday afternoon or
Saturday morning." The Times also seemed skeptical, observing that the day
before Faubus had "seemed reluctant to talk to the President about the Arkansas
situation," but, the Times reasoned, it would be "unseemly" to "refuse a meeting
with the President. ... That language hardly suggested he would ask for a conference and include in his request a statement of willingness to comply with
Federal Court decrees." However, the administration's spokespersons were
adamant in their claim that the governor's telegram " had reached the White
House without advance notice," and that no "White House staff members
including Sherman Adams, the President's principal deputy, had been in touch
with Governor Faubus by telephone in advance of the Governor's message." IOl
The meeting at Newport-"a momentous confrontation, set before a backdrop of high feeling and history"lo'-yielded some hope that the drama in
Little Rock could be resolved. The print-mediated environment implied that
because of the titanic stakes involved, reason would prevail. No longer was the
president "off stage," playing golf and delegating aides to keep him informed
about events. He was, instead, "taking charge" and acting in a manner suitable
to a chief executive facing a constitutional crisis.
Historically, we know that at the Newport meeting Eisenhower suggested that
instead of withdrawing the militia, Faubus simply "change the orders, directi ng
the Guard to maintain the peace while admitting the Negro pupils .. . .
Eisenhower said it was not beneficial to anybody ' to have a trial of strength
between the President and a governor because there could only be one outcome-that is, the state would lose, and I did not want to see any governor
humiliated.' Faubus seemed to seize the offer." Eisenhower and Faubus were
then joined by Adams, Hays, and Brownell. "To that group," ·according to
Ambrose, "Faubus reiterated his intention to change the Guard's orders."IO'
What actually transpired at the meeting between the two was not revealed
publicly. Our reading of notes dictated by the president covering the events at
Newport confirmed that by the end of the meeting, the president believed the
governor was "very appreciative" of his stance and it was Eisenhower's

CRISIS A.T LITTLE ROCK

205

·understanding that he was going back to Arkansas to act within a matter of
hours to revoke his orders to the Guard to prevent re-entry of the Negro children into the school."I06 The media explained: "Full details of the agreement
between the Governor and the President cannot be made public until
Governor Faubus returns to Arkansas and again assumes the powers of
Governor that lapse when he leaves the state."IO' Although the media could
not "reveal the details" of the meeting, the engaged public was assured that
Faubus had agreed to "respect and carry out Federal court orders for racial
integration of the Little Rock high schools."lo,
The coverage carried an additional message: The president had been firm
with the governor. Faubus reportedly received "a ' Dutch Uncle' talk from the
man under whom he served [in the Second World War). The President could,
of course, appreciate the governor's responsibility to preserve law and order in
his state.... But when it came to flouting the authority of the courts there
could be no compromise, no other answer. The courts must be obeyed."I"
·[T)he result," according to Time magazine, "was clear: the President of the
United States had flatly insisted that the governor of Arkansas must bow to the
law and withdraw from his position of rebellion.""0
Thus, immediately following the Newport conference, there was a collective
sense that the crisis of Little Rock may be over-resolved by the president.
However, when Faubus returned to Little Rock he neither withdrew the Guard
nor changed their orders. Now the narrative shifted and "an air of pessimism
crept into the situation" as reliable sources indicated that Faubus had "hardened ... his attitude:'11I
Faced with the stark realization that Faubus was not going to honor the
agreement reached in Newport, Eisenhower immediately "wanted to issue a
statement denouncing Faubus for his duplicity," but was talked out of it by
Brownell and Adams.11l Instead, two separate messages seemed to come out of
the White House. Publicly, press secretary James Hagerty "would not concede
that the [Newport) conference ... between the President and Governor Faubus
had been a failure. Nor would he say whether the President felt the Governor
had failed to keep promises made to him." Instead the administration adopted
a "wait and see" public stance. I13
The White House also leaked a statement Eisenhower reportedly made to
staffers indicating he was '''deeply disappointed'" voluntary efforts had failed
to settle the school integration controversy at Little Rock. This pronouncement
was interpreted as "an official admission that the conference with Governor
Orval E. Faubus here last Saturday had failed to produce the results the
President had expected."11<
Act two moved toward a conclusion with a hearing held in Judge Ronald N.
Davies' federal court on 20 September. Faubus did not appear in person, but
his lawyers "read a statement questioning the federal court's authority," and
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then left. Judge Davies "promptly enjoined Faubus and the Guard from inter·
fering with the progress of integration at Central High."115 Newsweek magazine
wrote that a "legal point of some importance in the problem of integration was
settled last week in Little Rock, Ark.: The National Guard cannot be used to
enforce segregation."116 The Justice Department greeted that ruling with " relief
and satisfaction." Engaged publics were told that in the "view of officials . ..
the integrity of the judicial process and the principle of Federal supremacy had
been victorious ... . [TJhe first officially backed physical resistance to the pol·
icy had ended in failure."'17
The governor issued a statement that although he had instructed his attor·
neys "to exhaust every legal remedy to appeal," he would comply with the
order as long as it was in effect."B The legal pathway was cleared for the nine
black students to enter Central High School. After issuing the orders to with·
draw the Guard, Faubus promptly left for Georgia to attend a conference of
southern governors.
A Touchstone Incident: Violence at Central High School
On 23 September, a "howling racist mob gathered around Central High,
screaming protests against integration.'" While the mob busied itself beating
four black reporters, eight black students slipped into Central through a side
door. Urged on by screams of "The niggers are in our school; the mob rushed
police lines. Shouts of "lynch the niggers" were reported. The black students in
the school were not physically harmed, but alarmed school officials sent them
home at noon. As Ambrose noted wryly, "Integration at Central High had
lasted three hours."I2· In a private letter dated 24 September 1957, the presi·
dent defended being away from the White House while the trouble ensued and
indicated that he did "not want to exaggerate the significance of the admittedly
serious situation in Arkansas." Calling Faubus "misguided" and "motivated
entirely by what he believes to be political advantage in a particular locality,"
the president maintained that the United States had "ample resources .. . to
cope with this kind of thing." "The great need; he said, was "to act calmly,
deliberately," and give "every offender opportunity to cease his defiance of
Federal law and to peaceably obey the proper orders of the Federal court."
Then, "even if it becomes necessary to employ considerable force; it can be
"understood by all, and the individuals who have offended are not fal sely
transformed into martyrs."12 1
'
Such moderate claims aside, the governor's prophetic warnings of violence
had been fulfilled. "Sut there was growing belief that the governor and his
entourage had taken steps to make his own predictions come true." 122 As
reports from Arkansas "clearly indicated the inability-and in some instances
the unwillingness-of the Little Rock police to cope with the mob,"'2l
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Attorney General Brownell said that "the President had to act. Eisenhower
agreed,"'" and prepared "his first step" toward "intervention."'25
At the close of act two, we find an explanation for how the narrative drama
had expanded. Symbolic influence occurs as protagonist and antagonist meet;
there is seeming agreement and hopes are raised for resolution. Then there is a
time of seeming betrayal and confusion followed by a touchstone incident that
dashes hope for a peaceful denouement. The violence occurring as the curtain
closes on act two demands resolution. The stage is now set for the dramatic
confrontation and conclusion contained in act three.

Act Three
Events in act three unfold quickly, dramatically and in rapid-fire, but not
unexpected, ritual sequence. The essence of the melodrama is highlighted in
act three; it is here that the crisis gets its most decisive definition and enactment.

,
I

Coercive Persuasion

The mediated description of "Eisenhower in action" was impressive. The
president was described as "angry" and threatening to use force to "prevent
obstruction of law and enforce court -ordered school integration" in Little
Rock. Calling the mob actions in Little Rock "disgraceful occurrences,"
Eisenhower declared: "[ will use the full power of the United States including
hatever force may be necessary, to prevent any obstruction of the law and to
rry out the orders of the Federal Court.""6-fhe New York Times observed that
his was "by far the strongest statement the President yet had made on any civil
ights matter. It marked a reversal of his 17 July news conference statement
hat he could not think of a situation in which he would want to use or where
it would be wise to use Federal troops to enforce decrees affecting civil rights
controversies."127
Truly "Administrative" Rhetoric
On the evening of 23 September Eisenhower signed "an emergency proclamation commanding all persons obstructing justice to cease and desist and to
disperse." This was labeled by the White House as a "necessary legal prerequilite to the calling out of Federal troops if the enforcement of law in Little Rock
continues to be impeded."'28 The next day it became obvious that "his legally
correct order went unheeded and a mob ringed Central High a second day.""·
The president took action, which Time magazine headlined as "Quick, Hard
and Decisive." "The weeks of patient working toward peaceful solution were

208

EISENHOWER 'S WAR OF W ORDS

over. ... Two aides and a secretary watched silently as President Eisenhower,
his decision made, picked up a pen and signed a historic document" ordering
the secretary of defense "to use the armed forces of the U.S. to uphold the law
of the land in Little Rock."Il.
An Appeal to Law and Order and Presidential Duty
On 24 September 1957, flanked by the portraits "of the four leaders whom
the President had stated he regards as the greatest American heroes-Benjamin
Franklin , George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Robert E. Lee"Eisenhower delivered from the White House a thirteen minute address to the
nation concerning the situation in Little Rock. It was "a firm address, with
some language unusually strong for President Eisenhower."' ll
The president provided background on a "sequence of events" leading to
the Little Rock school case. Eisenhower stated that the Little Rock School
Board had approved a "moderate plan for the gradual desegregation of the
public schools in that city."'" The United States court in Little Rock "which
has supervisory responsibility under the law for the plan of desegregation in
the public schools," approved the plan, finding it a "gradual rather than an
abrupt change from the existing system." The Court issued three separate
orders directing that the approved desegregation plan be carried out. "Proper
and sensible observance of the law then demanded the respectful obedience
which the nation has a right to expect from all its people. This, unfortunately,
has not been the case at Little Rock." Although never mentioning the governor
by name, the president blamed "demagogic extremists" and "certain misguided
persons, many of them imported into Little Rock by agitators," for creating the
present difficulties.
Eisenhower said that it had been his "hope this localized situation" would
be resolved on a local level. However, "[ llocal authorities have not eliminated
that violent opposition and, under the law, I yesterday issued a Proclamation
calling upon the mob to disperse." The main thrust of Eisenhower's address to
the nation was that, as president, he was bound to act to uphold the federal law
when it was violated. "Whenever normal agencies prove inadequate to the task
and it becomes necessary for the Executive Branch of the Federal Government
to use its powers and authority to uphold Federal Courts , the President's
responsibility is inescapable."
The president said that the use of the powers of the executive branch is
"limited to extraordinary and compelling circumstances. Manifestly, such an
extreme situation has been created in Little Rock." While acknowledging that
the Court's integration decision "affects the South more seriously than it does
other sections of the country," Eisenhower was conciliatory, telling the nation
that he knew from his "intimate personal knowledge;' that the "overwhelming
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majority of the people of the South-including those of Arkansas and of Little
Rock-are of good will, united in their efforts to preserve and respect the law
even when they disagree with it." As Ambrose observes, "In his statement to
the nation, the President emphasized that he was not sending U.S. troops into
the South to integrate the schools, but only to maintain the law."'"
The media coverage of the president's address was correct in its portrayal of
the president's concern for the maintenance of federal authority as well as in its
depiction of his conciliatory tone toward the South. In particular, our analysis
of the president's address reveals that Eisenhower added the following words
extemporaneously as he delivered his speech: "The running of our school system and the maintenance of peace and order in each of our States are strictly
local affairs and the Federal Government does not interfere except in very special cases and when requested by one of the several States." The only other significant passage added to the delivery copy of the address included the
following extemporaneous observation: "[ l)n a number of communities in
Arkansas integration in the schools has already started and without violence of
any kind."'"
The international implications of the Little Rock situation were also put into
studied relief by the president. Those states that complied with the Brown decisions "demonstrated to the world that we are a nation in which laws, not men,
are supreme." Where noncompliance occurs, "a tremendous disservice . .. has

been done to the nation in the eyes of the world." Moreover, "it would be difficult to exaggerate the harm that is being done to the prestige and influence, and
indeed to the safety of our nation and the world." America's "enemies are gloating over this incident; and, all the while, the U.S. is "portrayed as a violator" of
human rights. Troops will be removed, said Eisenhower, when the "City of
Little Rock ... return[s ) to its normal habits of peace and order and [then) a
blot upon the fair name and high honor of our nation in the world will be
removed. Thus will be restored the image of America."135
There was clear indication that international embarrassment had as much
to do with Eisenhower's motivation to resolve the Little Rock crisis as any concern over the morality of the cause or the consistency of his ideology. By implication, Little Rock constituted a loss in the propaganda battle with the
Soviets.'" Moreover, the legal arguments advanced in the speech and por·
trayed by the press coverage seemed to overshadow Eisenhower's stated international image concerns. The address conspicuously avoided the ethical
questions raised by resistance to desegregation. As will become even more
apparent, Eisenhower's focus on legal rather than moral issues, consistent with
his belief that it was inadvisable, if not impossible to legislate morality, enacted
an important rhetorical template with significant implications for the country
and future presidents.
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Federal Troops in Little Rock
As if reconnected to the coverage in act one, the mediated coverage in act
three reemphasized the observation that-as stated in Newsweek, "what happened at Little Rock went far beyond Central High." Il7 Eisenhower's "h istorymaking" decision was "based on a formal finding that his 'cease and desist'
proclamation issued last night, had not been obeyed" and "was one of historic
importance politically. socially, constitutionally."'" This immediate judgment
on U.S. cultural history was reified in the images surrounding the fede ral

"occupation."
Once in Little Rock, the soldiers of the 10Ist Airborne Division , some
thousand strong, "cowed racist agitators." "With bayonets fixed on their M-I
rifles. troops in battle dress broke up small, sullen knots of civilians as SOOI1 as
they formed" around the school. As the New York Times put it: "Integration at
bayonet point was effected at 9:25 a.m., forty minutes after the o peni ng
bell."'"
Then the commanding officer, General Edwin Walker. delivered a "lecture
on civics" to the white students assembled in the auditorium of Central High
School. As Lile magazine portentously explained, "He assured the studen ts
they had nothing to fear from the troops. But in solemn voice and with steely
deliberation he warned that any students who interfered with the integration
plans would be removed by officers and handed over to the local police. Most
of the students applauded." Life readers were also told: "No citizen, including
the President, thought that this settled anything except that the federal government is supreme. This is all the troops were supposed to prove.""OThus.
there was a mediated reality that suggested that the federal intervention in
Little Rock did not end the dispute.
Another piece of evidence supporting this view is Governor Faubus's reconstruction of "the battle of Little Rock" two days after the "occupation" of the
city by the 10Ist Airborne. The governor's stories of abuse at federal hands
abounded. But few, including other Southern governors, took him seriously.
and these recriminations probably should be considered a mere epilogue.
We do believe, however, that the rhetorical contours of act three deserve a
bit more scrutiny. The use of coercive persuasion, adm inistrative rhetoric, a
major national presidential address stressing law and order, duty, and national
unity, and the commitment and ongoing presence of troops all gave engaged
publics a mediated perception of crisis. Each of these characteristics was also
crucial in reifying the crisis atmosphere established in acts one and two. The
final act, of course. was pivotal in completing the dramatic narrative.
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IMPLI CATIONS AND CoNCLUSION

According to Edelman, "The dissemination of contradictory messages and
the alternation of threat and reassurance ... serve both to keep people anxious
and to keep them docile." Villains, victims, and heroes are crucial to the political news story; and it is the dynamism of this interactive spectacle that is critical, not necessarily the substance of the story itself. Thus news reports tend to
focus upon "constructed reality" rather than the dynamics of immediate experience and its situated import.'" The mediated images help construct our joint
aense of contemporary political reality; however, in the heat of the symbolic
battle, we may be unable to conduct a close examination of structural relations
accounting for the actual meaning of unfolding events and to find the immediate curative historical narratives that help explain that experience.
Revisionist historians and recent presidential scholars have gradually
reassessed Eisenhower's leadership abilities as well as his actions on civil
rights.'" R. Gordon Hoxie, for example, argues that Eisenhower has been
"(q)uite unfairly ... portrayed as dragging his feet in the civil rights area." At
the time, regarding Little Rock, however, Eisenhower " had (the) overwhelming
support of the press."'" While this may be true, Eisenhower's actions were not
unanimously praised by historians.
By constructing intensive narrative plots, story lines, villains, heroes ,
themes, images, and contexts which helped audiences define and interpret a
political crisis, mediated narrative requires careful analysis and circumspection. In this essay we have tried to indicate that part of such scholarly care
ought to include a context developed by historical investigation which helps
the scholar interpret more richly the mediated environment of the time. Both
the mediated environment and the history are rhetorical constructions. We
have merely tried to give both text and context clearer theoretical and methodological underpinnings.
We tentatively suggest that mediated crisis narratives may negatively impact
our immediate collective sense of history. Early historians judged Eisenhower
deficient in his handling of Little Rock. Revisionist historians were less harsh.
On. explanation, beyond the new archival evidence open to Eisenhower scholan, might be that the revisionists were a bit more removed from the mediated
coverage than earlier historians. Such ·speculation must remain merely that at
this writing. Other issues are a bit clearer.
After Brown vs. Board of Education, writes Elmo Richardson, "a great bull
lurched into (Ike's) orderly schoolroom." Richardson maintains further that
lice misjudged the intransigence of southern extremists and overestimated the
public's understanding of the issues-what Ike referred to as the "common
sense" of the American people. Eisenhower waited for events to cool and they
merely heated. Other negative evaluations were mounted by the critics. For
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example, it was argued that the international shame of Little Rock did little for
the "nation's image abroad" and many felt Eisenhower's interest in civil rights
was chiefly a result of that fact. According to Richardson, such an " image"
demeaned the administration's actual record.'"
Early historians also charged Eisenhower with weakness, citing his slow
response to the crisis and his seeming insensitivity to the morality of the situation. The mere fact that he was vacationing while human rights were being
trampled gave cause for political sniping.'" Arthur Larson, however, maintains
that the charge is misleading. He insists that Eisenhower was no different than
other presidents when denounced for inaction in their presumed role as chief
moral educators for the nation. While one may fault "[b ]ackground, environment, age, limited exposure to the problem ... or [even] an excessively constricted conception of the presidency," Larson argues, one must not attribute
Little Rock to "indecision, weakness or lack of initiative."146
We believe the president's so-called detach';'ent was a matter of both principled substance and rhetorical style. Such a view comports with what Fred I.
Greenstein has labeled Eisenhower's "hidden-hand" presidency.'47Certa inly
Eisenhower's principled position to avoid, if at all possible, federal intrusion
into the lives of U.S. citizens was a tack that was easily demonstrable early in
the first campaign and consistently held throughout his presidency. As
Eisenhower indicated by night letter to Senator Richard B. Russell on 27
September 1957, "Few times in my life have I felt as saddened as when the
obligations of my office required me to order the use of force within a state to
carry out the decisions of a Federal Court." Yet the president lamented:
"Failure to act. . . would [have) belen] tantamount to acquiescence in anarchy
and the dissolution of the union."'"
We believe Eisenhower's public style was in opposition to mediated melodramatics of any sizeable dimension. Ike's moderation, or, for some, extreme
restraint could have been (and perhaps properly was) perceived as especially
unseemly in the context of a mediated crisis. The president paid a price north
and south for trying to walk the tightrope between what he termed, the
"extremists" on either side. ''''The president's style was especially in relief du ring Little Rock and we believe it was incommensurate with the mediated
imperatives. Even if there is an element of truth to perceptions of Eisenhower
as reactionary rather than initiator-as one who left details to others and
subsequently paid the price-such negative evaluations can hardly explain
the social, moral, and political complexities that Little Rock would come to
symbolize.
If unforeseen circumstances forced Eisenhower to intervene at Little Rock,
positive and negative judgments on the propriety, intensity, and consistency of
his actions would engage audiences no matter what he did or when he did it,
nor would it please all participants vis-a-vis how it was accomplished. Such

CRISIS AT LI1TLE R OCK

213

evaluation is the natural outcome of testy and intractable domestic conundrums faced by all presidents. Such judgments are necessary if not sufficient
conditions for mass-mediated politics. While we still might censure
Eisenhower for narrow vision, narrow construction of the powers of the presidency, a flawed understanding of the separation of powers, and a certain
amount of undue restraint owing to his pro-southern sensibilities (both political and personal), given the novelty of his charge and the intensity of the political and social stakes, one might be hard pressed to find a president to do
better under similar circumstances. By both photograph and printed word, an
historical epoch was captured in the mediated realities. We have tried to temper part of the heady immediacy of these media-documented events with the
historical record.
A comparison between Eisenhower and his successor John F. Kennedy is
surely instructive in this context. Neither the first nor the last president to go
slow on moral advocacy efforts, Eisenhower was the first president to confront
a monumental federal-state conflict over civil rights in this century, and his
hard knocks were instructive and sobering to subsequent presidents. And while
it may be the case that John F. Kennedy finally did throw down the moral
gauntlet and perform the expected ritual of moral educator after the
Birmingham crisis in 1963, there were, arguably, two long years of inaction on
his part with respect to black civil rights. 'so Kennedy's inaction was in part due
to the ghosts of Little Rock and the long shadows of federal bayonets raised on
southern soil. Kennedy also suffered recriminations for action too little and
too late on this great moral frontier. In addition , both Eisenhower and
Kennedy feared international opprobrium during their respective civil rights
challenges. Both were anxious to resolve the incongruity of exporting "freedom" abroad and the increasing evidence of its absence in the United States.
The Soviet Union, of course, was exploiting the inequities involved for its own
purposes. lSI Little Rock and Birmingham cast a domestic shadow that ran
willy-nilly into the center of the Cold War.
Finally, given the widespread public accounts of President Eisenhower's
feelings about the Supreme Court's integration decision, his sympathy for the
South, and his concerns for the doctrine of states' rights, we find that the president may have inadvertently given comfort to the very extremists he decried
in his televised address. As Tony Fryer asserts, "Long after the end of the crisis
... Little Rock retained a place in the nation's collective memory." Little Rock
became a harbinger of future racial unrest in this nation . Fryer faults both
Eisenhower and Faubus with being "unwilling to subordinate narrow electoral
goals to the enforcement of moral principle." And, without necessarily questioning their motives, both men certainly "entangled desegregation in a mass
of political considerations that invited confrontation." Fryer also highlights a
historical trend:
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The focus on legalism. which continued until at lea st the 19805, ha d the effect

of confusing means with end s. Obedience to law itself-not th e subst:Jnti ve
vOI lu e of eq ual educ3 ti onal opportunity-became the basis for both compli ance and resistance. In short, many g over nm e nt leaders expected first
Southerners, then all Americans . to accept minority rights as a m atter of
co mpul sion rather than co nsent . IS2

Ironically, then, if Fryer is correct, Eisenhower's discourse on civil rights, wi th
its focus on law and order, served to reinforce the very thing Eisenhower most
feared, legal co mpulsion on a contested moral issue. For while it was the case
that Eisenhower fully believed that the issue indeed was a moral question, he
railed against legal sanctions as remedies, especially remedies that would put
the federal government at loggerheads with the states.
In turn , " focus on the rule-of-Iaw led inevitably to controversy over the
nature of judicial power in a representative democracy." Thus the pol arized
camps between local and federal authority and between judicial activism versus restraint were allowed to set up their tents in a valley rent by conflict. The
result of this debate over federal versus state authority and the nature and
scope of "proper" exercise o f judicial power " was that questions of moral
principle " were submerged and subordinated to a "co nservati ve
moderation ."l53 Thus did the nation veer from its traditional ideals of justice,
encapsulated in notions of equity and fairness embodied in a representative
democracy for all.
Michael R. Belknap highlights a different lesson but a related legacy:
In leaving the job of co mbating these troublemakers to unrel iab le stal e
auth o rities. th e Eisenhowe r administration evaded an obligatio n. It al so
courted disaster. lillIe Rock was the price the natio n paid for the failure of
the President and th e Ju sti ce Depa rtment to assum e responsibility for con tro lling di so rder ignited by the Federal government it self.l54

Becau se "the violent bigots of the Eisenhower era made explosives t hei r
weapon of choice; Belknap argues, Eisenhower's emphasis on states' rights
merely allowed local officials in the South "to exploit [their power] to keep
blacks from exercising their constitutional rights."l 55
Perhaps Eisenhower did not take up the moral gauntlet because of his abiding trust in the common sense and morality of the majority of the Ame rican
people, who, he seemed to feel , would eventually overcome the injustices of
racism. Certainly Eisenhower sent in federal troops to prevent mob rule and to
protect his and the nation's constitutional authority, as he had stated in his
address to the nation. E. Frederic Morrow, an Eisenhower appointee and the
"first black person in history to have served a United States President in an
executive capacity," ascribes Eisenhower's insertion of troops to more narrow
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motives: Faubus had ridiculed the president and the troops were sent in as a
direct response to personal insult.
We believe the mediated drama at Little Rock was inevitable. In that narrative, there was a rich source of conflict and deep emotional and legal tensions.
We find an intriguing ally for this stance in the words of Presbyterian minister
Dunbar H. Ogden, the president of the Greater Little Rock Ministerial
Association:

I"

This had to happen some-place in the South. It was inevitable that there was
going to be a plan. worked out, approved and accepted, for gradual integration. It was inevitable thllt somewhere a governor, under pressure of extreme
segregationists, was goin g to st o p integration by calling out the National
Guard. This may be loo ked back upon by futur e historians as the turning
point-for good- of race relations in this country. If the Sup reme Court's
interpretation of the Constituti on can be l11ad~ good in Little Rock, then it
can be made good in Arkans3s. th en eventually it COln be made good throughout the South. 1S7

We would merely observe here that the good minister's assessment that Little
Rock would be regarded by future historians as a "turning point" for "good"
"race relations" was perhaps a bit too optimistic.
Despite the mixed evaluations documented here, we would be remiss if we
did not end on one positive note. Eisenhower was the first president in the
twentieth century who faced a domestic crisis that had provoked images of the
Reconstruction era. It was a difficult and profoundly vexing problem, with long
roots and deep divisions. Events and subsequent mediated narratives emanating
from Little Rock, however, did much to force his hand. Thus we would observe
that media creates as well as reflects history and history can at times serve as a
corrective to mediated realities. Taking an even longer view of history, we believe
that by sending federal troops to Little Rock to protect the equal rights of children to attend school, Eisenhower became a key participant in helping restore a
political, historical, and cultural vision of a nation and a republicanism represented by one of his most esteemed predecessors, Abraham Lincoln.
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